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For in the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other liv-
ing creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other 
resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each 
other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped 
the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws 
and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which the power of speech has not helped us to establish1. 
Isocrates, Nicocles or the Cyprians
For the ancient Greeks, there was no other such an evident difference between hu-
mans and animals as the ability to speak. It was the rhetoric talent that provided 
political career and success both in ancient Greece and Rome; it was the intelligible 
speech that differentiated Greeks from foreigners, onomatopoeically called barba-
rians (barbaroi); and, finally, it was the language that enabled humans to abandon 
the state in which the beasts had lived. As Isocrates observed, owing to the power of 
speech man has founded cites, invented arts, and – what is probably the most im-
portant – created laws. This has resulted from the differentiation between ‘the good’ 
and ‘the right’ that was made possible by the use of language.
The importance of speech in the ancient Greek culture is mirrored in the term 
logos, which means both ‘language’ and ‘reason’. The lack of intelligible language was 
an evident proof that animals did not possess reason; or, alternatively, the irrational 
beings (zoa aloga), as animals were generally called in Greek, would never be able to 
utter any meaningful sound. There was no speech without reason, as communica-
tion required rational choices, and no reason without speech, because it was lan-
guage which enabled to develop the mind abilities2. This opinion had far-reaching 
1 Isocrates, Nicocles or the Cyprians, trans. G. Norlin, Cambridge, MA. 1980, 3.5–6.
2 In fact it is difficult to indicate which observation (about animals as speechless or animals as irra-
tional) antedates the other one. Stephen T. Newmyer suggests that in Stoic philosophy the notion 
that animals are not able to speak is the consequence of the belief that they do not possess reason 
(Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case against Animals, 
96
Katarzyna Kleczkowska, Bird Communication in Ancient Greek and Roman Thought
consequences, as most of the discussions on the moral status of animals in antiquity 
focused not on the question whether they are able to feel pain, but whether they 
are rational3.
However, there was one specific group of animals that seemed to undermine 
the view that beasts were not able to speak at all. While listening to the birds’ songs, 
some ancients could not hold back the impression that voices of these animals were 
meaningful and multifarious enough to be called a  language, therefore they must 
have resulted from a rational decision. What is more, certain birds, such as parrots, 
were able to imitate human voices, becoming an excellent argument to refute the 
theory that no animal could utter articulated sounds4.
Therefore for those thinkers who denied animal rationality, bird communication 
posed a philosophical problem. On the other hand, for those who defended animal 
intelligence, it became one of the best arguments to support the view that beasts are 
both rational and able to use language within their species. The aim of this article 
is to analyse the theories on bird communication of those who assumed that man 
is the only species possessing reason and of those who affirmed that animals were 
able to utter meaningful speech. Regarding the first group, I will particularly focus 
on the thought of Aristotle and Stoics, while the second one will consist of analysis 
of Plutarch’s, Sextus Empiricus’ and Porphyry’s thoughts. I will indicate the main 
themes connected with the topic of bird communication, strategies used by indi-
vidual thinkers when presenting the problem, and the main consequences of both 
denying and defending animal rationality in antiquity.
The most systematic study of animal communication in antiquity was conducted 
by Aristotle (384–322 BC). For this philosopher logos was an exclusively human 
feature. In Politics he explains that many animals have phone that reveals pleasure or 
pain and enables them to indicate those sensations to others, but only humans have 
speech (logos) to exchange information concerning what is advantageous and harm-
ful, and therefore also what is right and wrong5. Additionally, according to Aristotle, 
only human language consists of phonemes (stoicheion) that can be combined into 
more complex units, while indivisible sounds of animals cannot form any structure6. 
“Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, New Series” 1999, Vol. 63, No. 3, p. 102), whereas John 
Heath argues that it is the Greek observation that animals are speechless which antedates the notion 
that they are irrational (The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and 
Plato, Cambridge 2005, p. 172).
3 The most thorough investigation on this topic so far has been conducted by Richard Sorabji in his 
book Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate (New York 1995).
4 Ancients, especially Romans, were fascinated by imitating abilities of parrots, as can be seen for 
example in Ovid’s Amores 2,6 and Statius’ Silvae 2,4, poems devoted to these birds.
5 Aristotle, Politics, trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, MA. 1944, 1253a10–14.
6 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. W. H. Fyfe, Cambridge, MA. 1932, 1456b22–25.
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In human language word has meaning established by convention and therefore it 
should be treated as a symbol, while animal voice is just a natural predisposition7.
Even though Aristotle assumes that animal sounds do not base on symbols and 
cannot indicate any moral values, he is particularly interested in birds voices which 
seem to be different from those of other species. In The History of Animals he writes: 
“Certain species of birds above all other animals, and next after man, possess the fac-
ulty of uttering articulate sounds”8. Birds owe this specific ability to the anatomy of 
their tongues. According to Aristotle, the language (dialektos) is the articulation (di-
arthrosis) of voice (phone) by the instrumentality of the tongue – vowels are produced 
through voice and larynx, while consonants through tongue and lips9. Many animals 
have dialektos, but only human tongue is free, broad and soft enough to pronounce 
various phonemes10. Nevertheless, birds’ tongues are also suitable for uttering varied 
sounds which make their language more advanced than that of other animals:
All [birds] are furnished with a tongue, but the organ is variable, being long in some 
birds and broad in others. (...) [The faculty of uttering articulate sounds] is chiefly 
developed in broad-tongued birds11.
In being broad is comprised the possibility of becoming narrow; for in the great the 
small is included, but not the great in the small. What has been said explains why, even 
among birds, those that are most capable of [uttering sounds]12 are such as have the 
broadest tongues; and why the viviparous and sanguineous quadrupeds, where the 
tongue is hard and thick and not free in its motions, have a very limited vocal articula-
tion. Some birds have a considerable variety of notes. These are the smaller kinds. But 
it is the birds with talons that have the broader tongues. All birds use their tongues to 
communicate with each other. But some do this in a greater degree than the rest; so 
that in some cases it even seems as though actual instruction were imparted from one 
to another by its agency13.
It seems that according to Aristotle, birds are able to transmit not only simple sensa-
tions like pleasure and pain14 but also additional information. What is more, they are 
also capable of teaching their nestlings to sing what means that birds’ voice is not just 
natural predisposition, as in case of other species, but a result of education:
7 Aristotle, On Interpretation, trans. E. M. Edghill, 16a20–29 [on-line:] http://classics.mit.edu/Aris-
totle/interpretation.html [30.09.2015]. 
8 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, trans. D`Arcy Wentworth Thompson, Oxford 1910, 504b.
9 Ibidem, 535a–b. See T. Fögen, op. cit., p. 219.
10 Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, trans. W. Ogle, Oxford 1912, 659b28–660a29.
11 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, op. cit., 504b.
12 The original phthengomenoi grammata was translated by William Ogle as “pronouncing letters” but it is 
not consistent with the idea of Aristotle that only humans are able to pronounce individual phonemes.
13 Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, op. cit., 660a28–660b2.
14 See S. T. Newmyer, Animals in Greek and Roman Thought..., op. cit., p. 61.
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Of little birds, some sing a different note from the parent birds, if they have been 
removed from the nest and have heard other birds singing; and a mother-nightingale 
has been observed to give lessons in singing to a young bird, from which spectacle we 
might obviously infer that the song of the bird was not equally congenital with mere 
voice, but was something capable of modification and of improvement15.
Therefore the language of birds, as capable of modifications, is much more develo-
ped than those of any other animals. But still, according to Aristotle, only humans 
possess logos. It can be exemplified by his view on the parrots’ mimicry of human 
voice:
As a  general rule all birds with crooked talons are short-necked, flat-tongued, and 
disposed to mimicry. The Indian bird, the parrot, which is said to have a man’s tongue, 
answers to this description16.
Aristotle admits that a parrot is described as having a man’s tongue (anthropoglotton). It 
is consistent with the popular idea that this bird has a human voice and can be taught 
Greek, as it is described for example by Ctesias17. But even though parrot’s utterance 
is articulated and consists of different phonemes, according to Aristotle it is nothing 
more than a mere imitation – logos is not involved in this process. Similar opinion can 
be found in The Life of Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus (c. 170–248 CE):
...birds know what they learn from men; for the birds will wish you “farewell,” and say 
“Good day” or “Zeus help you,” and such like, without understanding what they say 
and without any real sympathy for mankind, merely because they have been trained to 
move their tongue in a certain manner18.
It is also the philosophy of Stoics that has strongly influenced both ancient and 
modern attitude to animals. According to their doctrine, humans owe nothing to 
creatures that are irrational, as they cannot understand and share the concept of mo-
rality19. Even if the soul (psyche) of both humans and animals consists of eight parts, 
the last part, hegemonikon (‘governing principle’) only in humans developed into the 
faculty of reason. As the meaningful language comes from the rational hegemonikon, 
animals are not capable of speaking and their vocalisation arises from the impulse 
15 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, op. cit., 536b.
16 Ibidem, 597b.
17 Ctesias, Indika, F45.8 [in:] A. Nichols, The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and 
Commentary with an Introduction, 2008 [A dissertation to the University of Florida].
18 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana, trans. F. C. Conybeare, 1912, 1.7 [on-line:] http://www.
livius.org/sources/content/philostratus-life-of-apollonius/ [30.09.2015].
19 See S. T. Newmyer, op. cit., p. 104.
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(horme)20. As the consequence of being rational, humans possess the ‘internal reason’ 
(logos endiathetos) which gives rise to external ‘vocalised reason’ (logos prophorikos)21.
The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus of Soloi (c. 280–208 BC) notes that the phe-
nomenon of birds communication is not quite relevant to this concept. As Varro 
reports, Chrysippus affirms that both children and some birds, such as crows and 
ravens, possess the ability of utterance that differs from the expression of other ani-
mals. However, he reports, they are not able to produce real words – their utterance 
is not the real speech (loqui) but a quasi-speech (ut loqui). It is because they are not 
aware of syntax22. It means that certain birds and children possess the pure vocal 
utterance (logos phophorikos) but the meaningful inner language based upon reason 
(logos endiathetos) is an exclusive ability of fully developed humans, as only they are 
able to connect audible sound production with inner ideas23.
The opposite view to the one of Aristotle and Stoics is presented by Plutarch 
(c. 50–125 CE) in his dialogue On the Intelligence of Animals. For Aristotimus, one 
of the characters of the dialogue, the birds’ ability to mimicry is an evident proof 
that animals possess logos as they are capable of uttering articulated sounds and learn-
ing. What is more, even untrained birds can utter such subtle voices that they often 
become an inspiration for poets:
As for starlings and crows and parrots which learn to talk and afford their teachers 
so malleable and imitative a vocal current to train and discipline, they seem to me to 
be champions and advocates of the other animals in their ability to learn, instructing 
us in some measure that they too are endowed both with rational utterance and with 
articulate voice; for which reason it is quite ridiculous to admit a comparison of them 
with creatures who have not enough voice even to howl or groan24. And what music, 
what grace do we not find in the natural, untaught warbling of birds! To this the most 
eloquent and musical of our poets bear witness when they compare their sweetest songs 
and poems to the singing of swans and nightingales25.
Regarding the sweet songs of a nightingale, even the Roman Stoic philosopher Sene-
ca (c. 4BC – 65 CE) admits that it is more charming and melodious than any hu-
man voice, yet only man possesses reason (ratio)26. The example of a nightingale is 
expanded by Plutarch with the reference to the Aristotle’s description of this bird 
teaching her nestling. Plutarch observes that teaching requires more intelligence 
20 Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. H. F. A. von Arnim, Stuttgart 1964, 2.821. See S. T. Newmyer, 
Animals in Greek and Roman Thought: A Sourcebook, New York 2011, p. 60.
21 Ibidem; idem, Speaking of Beasts..., op. cit., p. 103.
22 Varro, On the Latin Language, trans. R. G. Kent, Cambridge, MA. 1938, 6.56.
23 T. Fögen, Animal Communication [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and 
Life, ed. G. S. Campbell, Cambridge 2014, p. 221.
24 Aristotle describing fish voices compares them to the sounds of birds (Historia Animalium, 535b).
25 Plutarch, On the Intelligence of Animals, [in:] idem, Moralia, trans. H. Cherniss, W. C. Helmbold, 
Cambridge, MA. 1957, 973A.
26 Seneca, Moral Epistles, trans. R. M. Gummere, Cambridge, MA. 1917, 76.9–10.
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than learning, therefore imitation is not the only ability of birds; they are as well 
capable of educating their young to improve their singing:
Now since there is more reason in teaching than in learning, we must yield assent to 
Aristotle when he says that animals do teach: a nightingale, in fact, has been observed 
instructing her young how to sing. A further proof that supports him is the fact that 
birds which have been taken young from the nest and bred apart from their mothers 
sing the worse for it; for the birds that are bred with their mothers are taught and learn, 
not for pay or glory, but for the joy of rivalling each other in song and because they 
cherish the beautiful in their utterance rather than the useful27.
The anthropomorphism, a  strategy frequently used by Plutarch, was quite a  com-
mon way of describing animals in antiquity28. It is evident in the story of a Roman 
barber’s jay (kitta). The bird is described as able to mimic a variety of sounds: hu-
man language (anthropou rhemata), animal voices (therion phthongous), and sound of 
instruments (psophous organon). It happened once that during a funeral trumpeters 
stopped in front of the barber-shop and played for a long time. Afterwards the jay 
remained silent for a certain period of time. Plutarch cites different opinions on this 
enigmatic incident: some people affirmed that the bird was stunned by trumpets 
or poisoned by a rival bird-trainer. But according to Plutarch, the jay did not lost 
its voice or ability to hear but it was silent deliberately, practising the imitation of 
the trumpet – as it finally reproduced the sound meticulously29. For Plutarch, the 
conscious silence of the bird is an example of a self-instruction (automatheian) and 
a proof of the rational operation. As Thorsten Fögen observes, according to Plutarch, 
birds do not imitate sounds randomly but make a conscious reflection on what they 
want to convey, what goes beyond blind mimicry30.
It was also Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210 CE) who disagreed with the concep-
tion that logos is an exclusively human feature. As a physician probably belonging to 
the so-called Empiric school, philosophically allied with the Sceptics, he denied the 
point of speculations on the human and animal nature because of inability of their 
comprehension31. In his Outline of Pyrrhonism Sextus presents several arguments 
against the “dogmatics” (dogmatikoi), as he calls the Stoics, inter alia about animal 
rationality. This rationality of animals, according to Sextus, is evident in the example 
of their communication. Although Empiricus in his work focuses mainly on dog 
intelligence, he also mentioned bird language and holistically analyses the phenome-
non of animal communication:
27 Plutarch, op. cit., 973B.
28 J. Mossman, Plutarch on animals: rhetorical strategies in “de sollertia animalium,” “Hermathena” 
2005, No. 179, pp. 147 ff.
29 Plutarch, op. cit., 973C–E. See T. Fögen, op. cit., p. 222.
30 T. Fögen, op. cit., pp. 222–223.
31 See S. T. Newmyer, Animals in Greek and Roman Thought..., op. cit., p. 64.
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We observe that animals (...) give forth humanlike sounds, including jays and such others. 
Even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational animals, it is not at 
all unlikely that they are using language though we do not understand it but suppose 
it uniformly meaningless. We hear dogs giving forth one sound when they are warding 
off enemies and another when they are howling, and yet another when beaten and still 
another when they are fawning. Thus if one were to look closely at the matter, one would 
note a great variety of utterances in this and other sorts of animals in differing situations, 
so that it could readily be said, judging from these circumstances, that the so-called irra-
tional animals have a share of external reason. If they are inferior to humans neither in the 
sharpness of their perceptions nor in internal reason, nor, to go further, in external reason, 
they should then be no less trusted than we in respect to their sensory impressions32.
Sextus observes that birds, such as jays, utter humanlike (anthropinas) sounds. Con-
trary to Aristotle, Empiricus perceives such skill as a counterargument to the Stoic 
theory that only humans possess logos because jays also make meaningful, articulate 
sound. Their utterance is comprehensible but Sextus uses this example also as a start-
ing point for a broader discussion on how we can judge the animal utterance as 
meaningless since we do not understand it. This argument, even though presented 
rather in order to challenge the “dogmas” of Stoicism than to defend animals33, be-
comes a solid argument in the works of the second (besides Plutarch) most known 
animal defender of antiquity, Porphyry (c. 234–305 AD).
Porphyry joins Sextus in his critique of the Stoic conception of animal irratio-
nality. He also mentions that we do not understand animal sounds, just as foreign 
languages, which resemble for us “the clangour of cranes”34. According to Porphyry, 
beasts communicate in a manner that was given by the nature and their sounds are 
readily comprehended within their species. Moreover, there is no reason to assume 
that animals do not first think silently in the soul about what they experience before 
saying it – and therefore one cannot say they do not possess both kinds of logos – 
endiathetos and phophorikos35. “This is just as if crows should think that their voice 
alone is external reason, but that we are irrational animals, because the meaning of 
the sounds which we utter is not obvious to them,”36 adds Porphyry. He observes 
that even if sounds of animals are incomprehensible for us, people who live close to 
them, like shepherds or cowherds, readily understand animal messages, for example 
that they are hungry, thirsty or weary37. Similarly to Sextus Empiricus, Porphyry 
suggests that the variety of voices uttered by animals is a proof that these sounds are 
32 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. S. T. Newmyer, 1.73–76 [in:] S. T. Newmyer, Ani-
mals in Greek and Roman Thought..., op. cit., p. 65.
33 S. T. Newmyer, Animals in Greek and Roman Thought..., op. cit., p. 64.
34 Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, trans. Th. Taylor, 1823, 3.3 [on-line:] http://www.
tertullian.org/fathers/porphyry_abstinence_00_eintro.htm [30.09.2015]. Cf. Homer, Iliad, trans. 
A. T. Murray, Cambridge, MA. 1924, 4.433‒438.
35 Porphyry, op. cit., 3.2–3.
36 Ibidem, 3.5.
37 Ibidem.
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meaningful, as there is a difference between utterances of an animal being terrified, 
summoning their young to food or fighting38.
In the discussion on birds language, Porphyry goes a step further than Plutarch 
and Sextus. He observes that “no one who has learnt our language is able to teach us 
through ours the meaning of what is said by brutes”39. Therefore animal language 
seems to be unfathomable for humans and some people are given a false impression 
that animal sounds are meaningless. However, some myths and legends tell about 
fortunate individuals, in particular seers who were able to communicate with ani-
mals, especially birds, such as Melampus, Tiresias, and not much prior to Porphyry’s 
time Apollonius of Tyana. This ability allowed them to learn from birds about future 
events or incidents that had occurred in other places. Porphyry narrates that even his 
associate once had a servant who understood the meaning of sounds made by birds 
and claimed that all of them were prophetic40. Porphyry adds that there are still 
some nations that understand the sounds of birds. Even augurs who practised divina-
tion while observing bird flight are classified by Porphyry as those who are capable of 
understanding the language of animals, as they learn to distinguish birds’ sounds41.
Porphyry adds a piece of interesting information about the prophesying abilities 
of birds. Like most of the ancients, he perceives them as the messengers between 
people and gods:
The Gods, however, silently indicate their will, and birds apprehend their will more 
rapidly than men, and when they have apprehended it, they narrate it to men as much 
as they are able42.
Porphyry also cites the fragment of Aristotle in which the nightingale teaches its 
young to sing as an example of animal intelligence43. Contrary to Aristotle, Porphyry 
perceives animal ability to mimicry as the proof of reason. Interestingly, he does 
not conceal that birds such as parrots merely imitate human language, especially as 
a result of their keeper’s teaching, but he observes, basing on a legend about hyae-
nas44, that wild animals are also able to mimicry human voice to deceive shepherds. 
Therefore, such imitation is not just a result of taming, but the proof of intelligence:
If, however, it appears that they imitate us, that they learn the Greek tongue, and under-
stand their keepers, what man is so impudent as not to grant that they are rational, be-
cause he does not understand what they say? Crows, therefore, and magpies, the robin  
38 Ibidem, 3.4.
39 Ibidem, 3.3.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem, 3.4.
42 Ibidem, 3.5.
43 Ibidem, 3.6.
44 This legend has been cited also by Pliny the Elder (The Natural History, 8.44) and Claudius Aelia-
nus (On the Characteristics of Animals, 7.22).
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redbreast, and the parrot, imitate men, recollect what they have heard, are obedient 
to their preceptor while he is teaching them; and many of them, through what they 
have learnt, point out those that have acted wrong in the house. But the Indian hyaena, 
which the natives call crocotta, speaks in a manner so human, and this without a te-
acher, as to go to houses, and call that person whom he knows he can easily vanquish. 
He also imitates the voice of him who is most dear, and would most readily attend to 
the person whom he calls; so that, though the Indians know this, yet being deceived 
through the similitude, and obeying the call, they come forth, and are destroyed45. 
Regarding birds taming, Porphyry gives also an example of a partridge which was 
taught by him to utter voice similar to human. Porphyry reports that the bird evi-
dently tried to answer him, what may be also the proof of its reason:
When we were at Carthage, nurtured a tame partridge, which we caught flying, and 
which, in process of time, and by associating with us, became so exceedingly mild, that 
it was not only sedulously attentive to us, caressed and sported with us, but uttered 
a sound corresponding to the sound of our voice, and, as far as it was capable, answered 
us; and this in a manner different from that by which partridges are accustomed to call 
each other. For it did not utter a corresponding sound when we were silent, but when 
we spoke to it46.
It was also Celsus (2nd century CE), the author of an anti-Christian work entitled 
The True Word, who mentioned legendary people who can talk with animals, espe-
cially birds. His work survived only in fragments in Against Celsus by Origen but it 
includes observations on the nature of birds prophecy:
If, because man has been able to grasp the idea of God, he is deemed superior to the other 
animals, let those who hold this opinion know that this capacity will be claimed by many 
of the other animals; and with good reason: for what would any one maintain to be more 
divine than the power of foreknowing and predicting future events? Men accordingly 
acquire the art from the other animals, and especially from birds. And those who listen 
to the indications furnished by them, become possessed of the gift of prophecy. If, then, 
birds, and the other prophetic animals, which are enabled by the gift of God to foreknow 
events, instruct us by means of signs, so much the nearer do they seem to be to the so-
ciety of God, and to be endowed with greater wisdom, and to be more beloved by Him.  
The more intelligent of men, moreover, say that the animals hold meetings which are 
more sacred than our assemblies, and that they know what is said at these meetings, and 
show that in reality they possess this knowledge, when, having previously stated that the 
birds have declared their intention of departing to some particular place, and of doing 
this thing or the other, the truth of their assertions is established by the departure of the 
birds to the place in question, and by their doing what was foretold47.
45 Porphyry, op. cit., 3.4.
46 Ibidem.
47 Origen, Against Celsus, trans. R. Donaldson, 4.88, [on-line:] http://www.earlychristianwritings.
com/origen.html [30.09.2015]. See also the discussion on the motif of the swan in Plato (L. Sos-
nowski, „Duszny” zwierzyniec jako obraz człowieka Platona, „Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” 2012, No. 40). 
This bird sings when dying because of the joy of the forthcoming return to god.
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The argument of Celsus is directed against the Christian anthropocentric view of 
nature, including animals, which exist only to be divine signs interpreted by Chri-
stians. Resignifying animals as rational beings, Celsus tries to undermine Christian 
philosophy, especially the concept that all other beings had been created only to fulfil 
the needs of man. However, this fragment provides also interesting attitude to the 
prophesying abilities of birds. Similarly to Porphyry, Celsus supposes that birds are 
even closer to deity than humans, as they first learn divine messages.
Porphyry and Celsus belonged to the most influential opponents of Christianity in 
the ancient world. However, with the victory of this religion, the attitude towards 
animals have changed to their disadvantage. As Richard Sorabji proved, the ancient 
debate on the animal reason was multifarious and the image of animals as irrational 
beings had many opponents. Notwithstanding, Christianity was influenced only by 
one-side of this debate, the view of Aristotle and Stoics48.
The role of Aristotle in the formation of later philosophical attitude to animals 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, his strongly anthropocentric view on human-ani-
mal relations has influenced the Christian theology, in particular works of Thomas 
Aquinas, and indirectly the thought of many later philosophers. On the other hand, 
his profound study of animal behaviour, including birds communication, provided 
several arguments to those thinkers whose goal was to undermine the irrationality 
of animals. Both Plutarch and Porphyry have adopted Aristotle’s description of the 
nightingale instructing her nestlings as the evident proof of animal intelligence.
Both Aristotle and Chrysippus of Soloi admit that birds surpass other animals in 
their communication abilities. According to Aristotle, it is owing to the specificity 
of their tongues that the bird language is next after human’s in regard to articulation. 
Also Chrysippus describes the language of certain birds as similar to children tongue 
and calls it a quasi-speech. Nevertheless, for both Aristotle and Stoics, no rational 
operation precedes the vocalisation of sound produced by birds. What is more, the 
imitative abilities of animals such like parrots are nothing more than a mere mimicry.
However, for Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry, the imitation abilities 
of birds are the best argument that animals can utter articulate voices. Moreover, ac-
cording to Plutarch, the imitation of voices requires the capability of learning, which 
is a rational operation. He observes that animals are able not only to learn but also 
to teach (the example of the nightingale) and even to practice self-instruction (as in 
the story of barber’s jay), which requires even more intelligence. The learning and 
self-instructing abilities of birds are also illustrated in Porphyry’s story of the partrid-
ge. Porphyry suggests that numerous individuals from the past (Tiresias, Melampus, 
Apollonius of Tyana) communicated with birds which enabled them to foresee some 
events in advance. The prophetic and divinatory capability of birds, according to Por- 
phyry and Celsus, is the proof that these animals are even closer to gods than humans. 
Therefore, especially in the philosophy of late antiquity, the problem of birds ability to 
48 R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 2.
MASKA 28/2015
105
communicate goes beyond the mere question of their capacity of rational operation. 
It reaches the level of religious question and also in this case, according to Porphyry 
and Celsus, birds can prove that animals are not so much inferior to humans.
Birds were not the only animals that, according to ancients, proved that not only 
humans are capable of thinking. Nevertheless, because of the significance of speech 
in the Greek concept of reason, it was birds whose communication skills equipped 
numerous ancient philosophers with the arguments that might have refuted the view 
of Stoics. Even if these arguments are not quite convincing for us, we have to admit 
that birds singing is still one of the most charming and willingly used literary motifs.
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Summary
The aim of the article is to analyse ancient Greek and Roman theories on bird com-
munication. The author observes that the examples of bird communication were 
often used by ancient philosophers as arguments against the prevailing conception 
that only humans possessed reason. The article focuses mostly on the thought of Ari-
stotle, Stoics, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry. It indicates strategies used 
by those thinkers when describing bird communication, the main themes connected 
with this topic, and the main consequences of the discussion on animal rationality 
in antiquity.
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